About Face: A Perspective on Civilian Military Relations through the Lens of the Principal-Agent Theory by Swain, Randall
Ralph Bunche Journal of Public Affairs
Volume 3
Issue 1 Issues on Voter Participation among African
Americans and Bureaucratic Behavior
Article 5
June 2014
About Face: A Perspective on Civilian Military
Relations through the Lens of the Principal-Agent
Theory
Randall Swain
Eastern Kentucky University, randall.swain@eku.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalscholarship.bjmlspa.tsu.edu/rbjpa
Part of the Environmental Policy Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Public Affairs
Commons, Urban Studies Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Barbara Jordan Mickey Leland School of Public Affairs - Digital Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Ralph Bunche Journal of Public Affairs by an authorized administrator of Barbara Jordan Mickey Leland School of Public
Affairs - Digital Scholarship. For more information, please contact rodriguezam@TSU.EDU.
Recommended Citation
Swain, Randall (2014) "About Face: A Perspective on Civilian Military Relations through the Lens of the Principal-Agent Theory,"
Ralph Bunche Journal of Public Affairs: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://digitalscholarship.bjmlspa.tsu.edu/rbjpa/vol3/iss1/5
Ralph Bunche Journal of Public Affairs                 Spring 2014 
 
- 55 - 
About Face: A Perspective of Civil-
Military Relations through the Lens 
of Principal-Agent Theory 
 
 
 
Randall D. Swain 
Eastern Kentucky University 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
This essay uses the principal-agent theory to offer a framework for explaining shirking 
tendencies by the U.S. military in civil-military relations.  Through the lens of the framework 
presented here, the principal-agent theory explains why shirking tendencies by the U.S. 
military is more likely to occur when a Republican occupies the White House, than when it 
is occupied by a Democrat.  Besides providing a framework for conceptualizing civil-
military relations, the importance of this work lies in the manner in which the principal-
agent theory is applied.  While the majority of inquiries into principal-agent theory focuses 
on executive control of bureaucratic agencies that have domestic policy agendas, this is one 
of the few—if any—that uses principal-agent theory to examine executive control of an 
agency (the U.S. Military) that has a foreign policy related agenda.  
                                                                                                                                                     
 
Ever since 2003 when the United States invaded Iraq, civil-military relations has eroded 
and the tradition of civilian control of the military has been undermined (Sulmasy and Yoo 
2007; Perlstein 2012).  One of the obvious reasons for this erosion has been the prolonged 
state of war and disagreements between military brass and civilian elected and appointed 
political leaders over the conduct of the war (Kohn 2008; 2002; Meyers et al. 2007; Owens 
2006).  Disagreements between soldiers and politicians are just one of the causes of the 
erosion of civil-military relations in the United States.  Even before the commencement of 
the war on terror, there were cracks in the tradition of civilian control of the military (Ricks 
1997).   This illustrates the precarious nature of civilian control of the military in the United 
States.  While the principle of civilian control of the military is firmly entrenched in 
American civil-military relations, it has not gone unchallenged at various times.  This begs a 
larger question of whether discernible patterns that affect or contribute to the erosion of the 
principle can be identified. 
The purpose of this essay is to propose the argument that partisan control of the 
White House is an important determinant of civil-military relations, in general, and whether 
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the tradition of civilian control of the military is more likely to be undermined more 
specifically.  Moreover, this essay proposes that the principal-agent theory is the appropriate 
lens through which to assess civil-military relations in this country.  Principal-agent theory 
was imported from the field of economics to explain how political actors in the executive 
and legislative branches of government control the behavior and output of the bureaucracy 
(Miller 1997; Worsham et al. 1997).  According to the theory, principals refer to the 
president—as the constitutionally recognized chief executive—and congressional 
committees that control the purse strings of federal agencies who provide direction and 
oversight to executive branch agencies, who as agents, are expected to be responsive to the 
directives of their political superiors.   
According to the theory, the agents have informational advantages by having 
technical expertise and knowledge in the particular field that pertains to the federal agency’s 
policy jurisdiction (Wood and Waterman 1994). An important concept in principal-agent 
theory is the concept of shirking, which occurs whenever an agent subverts or dilutes the 
wishes and intentions of the principal.  This concept makes principal-agent theory ideal for 
conceptualizing and examining civil-military relations and civilian control of the military.  
Utilizing principal-agent theory to conceptualize and examine civilian control of the military 
relations marks an important contribution to studies on civil-military relations in that, few—
if any—inquiries into civil-military relations have done so through the lens of principal-
agent theory.  Yet, given that the military can be viewed as a politicized institution that has a 
“conservative and group centered bias” it seems fitting to apply the theory to this study 
(Hooker 2004, 6).    
In the sections that follow, I review previous work on principal-agent theory and 
then review the history and literature on civil-military relations.  Then, a theoretical 
proposition that undergirds the primary purpose of this work—that partisan control of the 
presidency and related executive branch agencies, affects civil-military relations in general 
and responsiveness to civilian control—is presented.  One of the shortcomings of this essay 
that will be elaborated on further in the conclusion is that this work constitutes a theoretical 
supposition that proposes a theory—long utilized for examining presidential and 
congressional control of executive branch agencies—for making assumptions about civil-
military relations and the principle of civilian control of the military, but does not offer 
testable hypotheses at this time.   
 
Previous Research on Principal-Agent Theory 
One of the obstacles that elected officials must overcome in controlling bureaucratic 
agencies is the expertise that bureaucrats have in their respective policy arenas.   Because of 
the expertise they have amassed through education and a career spent in mastering the 
technical and professional contours of their profession, individuals who have spent decades 
climbing bureaucratic ladders are in position to wield tremendous influence by the time they 
have reached the highest echelons in executive branch agencies.  The academic discipline of 
public administration has examined the considerable influence that bureaucrats are able to 
wield (Stivers 1994).  This research, however, is more concerned with enhancing and 
upholding agency responsiveness to the public in response to Wilson’s call for a politically 
neutral bureaucracy (Bryer 2007; Wilson 1887).  The larger issue of explaining how 
political institutions at the federal level control and influence the output of administrative 
agencies has been largely examined by political scientists.   
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) found that Congress overcomes information 
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asymmetry by relying on agency constituents to alert them whenever the agent deviates from 
the policy stipulations outlined by the principal.  According to McCubbins and Schwartz 
(1984), the relationship is analogous to firemen at a fire station responding to fire.  The 
constituencies of congressional representatives are like fire alarms, when they complain 
about treatment or lack of responsiveness from an executive agency.  When congressional 
representatives receive multiple complaints from their constituents about a particular 
department or agency, it signals to them that there is a serious problem that needs to be 
addressed.  Thus, like firemen in a firehouse who are alerted by a firehouse alarm that there 
is a fire somewhere in their district, complaints by legislative constituents about an 
executive branch agency function as an alarm informing that something is amiss within a 
particular executive branch agency.  The response options available to legislatures range 
from investigations to hearings. Calvert and Weingast (1982) found that agencies are 
responsive to the budgetary leverage wielded by Congress and that federal agencies will 
adjust their outputs to reflect the preferences of newly elected members of Congress.  When 
these new members were appointed to congressional committees with oversight 
responsibility for the executive agency’s policy jurisdiction, the executive agencies, 
according to the authors, adjusted their ideological stance and agency outputs to reflect the 
political ideology of the new committee members.   
The example they used in their research is the case of the Federal Trade Commission 
in the 1970s.  During the course of the decade, this commission went from having a pro-
business orientation to a strong consumer activist orientation and as a result, suffered a 
budget cut in 1979. The authors tell how the congressional sub-committee responsible for 
the FTC’s oversight had a turnover in membership and the new members’ ideological 
preferences were pro-business, which was totally opposite the pro-consumer orientation of 
the previous committee members.  The turnover in personnel on the congressional 
committee, with its new ideological orientation, placed the FTC out of step, ideologically 
speaking, with the new members on the subcommittee.  As a result of the ideological 
mismatch between the principal (new members on the congressional subcommittee), the 
agent—the FTC—experienced a reduction in its budget.   In other instances, federal 
agencies that failed to moderate their outputs fast enough to reflect the shift in policy 
preferences of congressional committee members also experienced similar fates (Calvert and 
Weingast 1982).   Calvert et al. (1989), Moe (1985), and Wood and Waterman (1991) found 
that the president wields considerable power in affecting bureaucratic outputs through the 
power of appointment.  Calvert et al. (1989) found that the chief executive’s power of 
appointment and the threat of legislative sanctions are both powerful influences on 
bureaucratic output.  Because policy making authority is occasionally delegated to 
professional administrators because of their technical expertise, the tendency to shirk—
activity that undermines or mitigates the authority of political superiors—on the part of 
bureaucrats is always a realistic possibility (Gailmard and Patty 2012).  
 Based on the research, one can surmise that whenever an ideological mismatch 
occurs between principals and agents as result of personnel changes in the institutions that 
act as principals, we can expect heightened degree of tension between the two actors.  In the 
research examined thus far, the heightened tensions have resulted in the principal imposing 
budget cuts in the budgets of agents.   Another cause of increased tensions between 
principals and agents are changes in established policies that have existed for so long that 
they have come to be viewed as property rights by clients served by agencies and 
bureaucracies (Kasternberg 2013).   
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Previous research on Civil-Military Relations  
Research on civil-military distinguishes between civil-military relations and civilian control 
of the military.  Civil-military relations refers to the relationship between a nation-state’s 
military and the society it serves while the concept of civilian control of the military refers 
to the extent to which elected politicians are able to exert authority over the armed forces in 
democratic societies (Hooker 2004).  One of the primary concerns of scholars who study 
civil-military relations is how to maintain the integrity of civilian control of the military and 
the identification of factors that are likely to upset or threaten the tradition of military 
subservience to elected political leaders (Hooker 2004).  Huntington (1957) points out that 
the tradition of civilian control of the military in the United States can be found in George 
Washington’s refusal to use his military power to grasp political power.  His surrender of his 
sword to Congress and the subsequent disbanding of the Continental Army showed unusual 
restraint that set the precedent for military subservience to civilian political authorities.  
Huntington’s research (1957, 231-233) goes on to illustrate how General William T. 
Sherman’s example further solidified the tradition started by George Washington.  Today, 
Sherman is almost as famous for his disavowal of public office—“If nominated, I will not 
accept, and if elected, I will not serve”—as he is, for the military exploits he accomplished 
on the battlefield.  For Sherman and the generals who followed him in administering the 
army in the decades after the Civil War, the subordination of the army to civilian political 
leadership was an important starting point for building a professional officer corps.  
After World War II, the increasing trend towards limited war resulted in pressure 
by political leaders—concerned with the larger geo-political objective of détente and the 
prevention of armed conflict with the U.S.S.R.—resulted in conflict between generals and 
admirals and elected politicians (Nix 2012).  The mismatch in political necessities and 
military objectives first became evident during the Korean War.   MacArthur's flagrant 
challenge to the Truman Administration's conduct of the Korean War is well documented 
and came about because of the former’s insistence belief that Truman’s will to win had been 
compromised by political considerations (Nixon 1982).  But what is less known is that there 
was near unanimous resentment among the major army field commanders towards Truman’s 
strategic objectives on the Korean Peninsula.  This trend was further exacerbated during the 
Vietnam War.  The root cause of tension in civil-military relations during these wars was the 
inability of military commanders to make tactical battlefield decisions without interference 
by civilian political leaders (Huntington 1957; Nix 2012).  Under President Lyndon 
Johnson, the level of meddling the tactical decision making by generals were viewed as 
particularly egregious as the president imposed restrictive rules of engagement on generals 
and in some cases selected bombing targets himself.  Johnson’s micromanagement of the 
war cast a pall of over civil-military relations that would last until the presidency of Ronald 
Reagan.   
 The success of the US Army in dispatching Iraq’s military afforded General Colin 
Powell, serving at the time as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and H. Norman 
Schwarzkopf an unusually high favorability rating in public opinion.  General Powell used 
his popularity to oppose President Bill Clinton’s policy on homosexuals serving in the 
military—“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”   In addition to the individual role General Powell 
played, several authors have stated that the military’s particular disdain for Clinton had a 
negative impact on the civil-military relations and the tradition of civilian control of the 
military (Kohn 1997; Desch 1998; Weignly 1993; Ricks 1997; Kohn 1997).  More than 
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Powell’s actions in publicly coming out against President Clinton’s policy on homosexuals 
serving in the military, the end of the Cold War and Clinton’s use of the military for 
missions that seemed to depart from the traditional mission of fighting wars—such as 
nation-building and humanitarian missions, seems to have had a more detrimental effect on  
civil-military relations (Ricks 1997; Nix 2012).  The end of the Clinton Administration and 
the advent of the war on terror since the presidential administration of George W. Bush, 
civil-military relations appears to have been shaped by the politics of budgeting as well 
asymmetrical warfare that has accompanied the fight against terrorism (Nix 2012;  Owens 
2006; Sulmasy and Yoo 2007).   
Feaver (1996) disagrees with the Huntington approach to theorizing civil-military 
relations. Huntington’s approach to civil-military relations is based on realism, one of the 
prevailing theories of international relations (Feaver 1996).  Instead, a more optimal 
approach, according to Feaver’s argument, is to view the military—and the political actors 
charged with providing oversight to the military—as rational actors.  In a subsequent work, 
Feaver (1998) outlines the conditions in which civilian principals are likely to monitor the 
military and when shirking is likely to occur by the latter.  In clarifying the concepts of 
working and shirking, Feaver (1998) defines shirking as any behavior taken by the military 
that connotes incompetence, insolence, or implementing orders of political principals in a 
way that undermines the ability of the principals to make future decisions.  He also proposes 
that monitoring by the principal goes hand in hand, with shirking tendencies because unless 
the actions of agents are monitored by principals, shirking is of no consequence and 
therefore irrelevant (Feaver 1998).  Moreover, the more likely the military’s actions are 
monitored by political superiors, the more likely shirking behavior will be detected. 
 
Justification for Principal-Agent Theoretical Approach  
The major contention of this essay is that although the principal-agent theory has rarely been 
used to frame the study of civil military relations and civilian control of the military, it 
should be.  With the exception of Feaver (1998), the majority of analysis on civil-military 
relations and civilian control of the military takes a realist approach.  It is time to bring civil-
military relations into discussions of executive branch control of bureaucratic agencies using 
principal-agent theory as the major paradigm for these discussions.   
Based on the analysis of the extant work on civil-military relations and the tradition 
of civilian control of the military, the ability on the part of political institutions to control 
and influence the actions of the military have been most readily apparent in situations and 
circumstances that seem to have a recurring theme.  The first common denominator on 
potential conflicts between principals and agent in our study is militarized conflict.  Whether 
the conflict was the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the first Gulf War—operationally named 
Operation Desert Shield—or the current war on terror, militarized conflict since the middle 
of the twentieth century appears to always have been attended by confrontation and 
disagreement between principal and agent over the conduct of the war.   
The second theme that seems to be a recurring pattern in the erosion of civil-
military relations is disagreement on policies directly affecting military personnel, or 
changes to established policies perceived by soldiers to have a deleterious effect on their 
well-being. Clinton’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is the most glaring, but not the only example 
of this occurrence.  Recent proposals to change the military’s retirement system has been 
vociferously opposed by military brass and has the potential to widen the rift between 
elected politicians and the military they are constitutionally charged to direct and provide 
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oversight (Kastenberg 2013).  George H.W. Bush’s proposal to reduce the size of the 
military following the end of the Cold War was met with disapproval by the military as well. 
These recurring themes, while not directly lending themselves to the argument that 
the party identity of the occupant of the White House is a cause for shirking by the military, 
does, however, bode well for analysis of the question through the lens of principal-agent 
theory.  The assumptions of the theory have been verified in political science research on the 
nature of American political institutions (Worsham, Marc and Ringquist 1997; Wood and 
Waterman 1991; Moe 1985; Calvert et al. 1989), and therefore seems to be but a leap, 
conceptually speaking, to apply these lessons to the ability of Congress and the presidency, 
as political institutions to control and influence the military and to assess the circumstances 
when its authority is challenged or undermined.  The specific incidents that have been used 
as anecdotes to describe the violations of established civil-military protocol can be 
operationally defined as shirking.   
In making the leap to the party label of the president being a potential factor in 
predicting shirking tendencies, it should be pointed out that civil-military relations appear to 
be more tenuous when a Democratic president occupies the White House.  If one were to 
review civil-military relations during the decades from 1950—when Democratic President 
Harry Truman relieved General Douglass MacArthur of his command in Korea—through 
the 1990s during the presidency of Bill Clinton, this most certainly seems to be the case.  An 
assumption that undergirds principal-agent theory is that party control of the executive 
branch matters when considering principal-agent relationships.  The close monitoring of the 
FTC, that eventually resulted in the commission experiencing a budget cut in 1979 can best 
be explained by partisan and ideological changes in the composition of the congressional 
subcommittee responsible for providing oversight to the FTC (Calvert and Weingast 1982).  
This is perhaps the strongest argument that the party label of principal matters and is likely 
to lead to increased levels of monitoring by principals.  Because military tradition and 
culture is inherently conservative and the political ideology of the officer corps tends 
towards conservatism, more so than it does liberalism, it is easy to see why civil-military 
relations might be especially tenuous when a Democrat is Commander-in-Chief (Ricks 
1997; 22-23).  The most recent anecdote that supports the rationale that partisanship should 
be included in models that analyze civil-military relations in the United States as principal-
agent relationship is the resignation of General Stanley McChrystal because of unflattering 
comments he made about Vice President Joseph Biden. 
 If one were to use partisan control of the White House as a research baseline, the 
literature on civil-military relations contains subtle clues as to how to best empirically test 
these assumptions.  A cross-sectional research design might be used to determine if 
presidential ideology is an appropriate predictor of military shirking. Officers at the pay 
grade of 0-7 and above who have resigned or retired from the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps 
between 1972 and 2000 could be identified and used as a measure of the military’s officer 
elite.  Retired officers are included in the analysis because they wait until after they are out 
of active duty status to give their opinions about the military or government policy that may 
have adversely affected their service. There have been previous incidents where retired 
colonels and generals waited until they were in retirement to criticize their civilian superiors.   
David Hackworth (1989) is an example of an officer whose disillusionment with 
the direction the Johnson Administration was taking in Vietnam resulted in a memoir in 
which he chronicled his discontent and disdain for his former political superiors.  If viewed 
as an attempt to undermine the ability of civilian principals to make future decisions, 
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Hackworth’s work (1989) could qualify as shirking behavior.  Moreover, Hackworth also 
suggests that while he always followed orders, in some cases to his discontent, he followed 
them in a way that would result in mission accomplishment—that met his satisfaction as 
required of a professional solider. Referring again to Feaver (1998), this could qualify as 
shirking:  
The agent is said to shirk when the military, whether through laziness, insolence,  
or preventable incompetence, does not do what the civilian has requested, or not in 
the way the civilian wanted, or in a way so as to undermine the ability of the 
civilian to make future decisions (1998 409-410).  
Thus, any time a general publishes a book or is quoted in the press in a way that undermines 
authority; it can be operationally defined as shirking.  A content analysis of national media 
for comments that could be considered negative or hostile to presidential policies would 
enable one to make a comparison of comments that could be construed as undermining the 
president’s policy objectives.   
Thus, comments such as those by General Boykin equating the religion of Islam to 
idolatry could be counted as a shirking incident. After the articles have been analyzed for 
their negative or injurious content, a comparison could be made between comments made by 
generals and admirals during Democratic and Republican presidential administrations, 
during the time period specified above to determine if such comments are more likely to 
occur under a Democratic or Republican presidency. 
 Thompson (1985) proposes a solution available to public servants who become 
disillusioned with policies that provide another possible method of operationalizing shirking 
tendencies—resignations.  Resignation rates of generals and colonels, especially generals 
occupying positions of political significance would undoubtedly undermine the President’s 
policy agenda.  One could identify the number of officers at the pay grade of 0-7 and above 
who resigned, were relieved of command or retired during the specified time period and 
make comparisons between presidential administrations.  One might expect a higher rate of 
resignations and retirements of senior officers during the administrations of moderate 
Democratic presidents.  Referring again to relations between Colin Powell and Clinton over 
their disagreement on Clinton’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy,” it is questionable as to 
whether Powell would have announced his retirement in 1993 had George H.W. Bush not 
lost the 1992 presidential election.  It seems likely that Bush’s reelection in 1992 would not 
have led to Powell’s retirement from the military.  Statistical analysis could be undertaken to 
analyze rates of retirements and resignation occurring during the administrations of two 
liberal presidents, Lyndon Johnson and Bill Clinton, and two conservative presidents, 
Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan.  Results from this analysis could be used to make more 
concrete inferences about the likelihood of Powell’s retirement from military service under 
Clinton’s presidency, versus whether he would have stepped down had Bush senior retained 
the presidency. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
The primary purpose of this work was to strengthen the argument for making principal- 
agent theory the paradigm for analyzing civil-military relations and the tradition of civilian 
control of the military.  Furthermore, this work argues for examining the role that the party 
identity of the occupant of the White House in patterns of civil-military relations.  My 
contention is that monitoring and shirking is more likely to occur when a Democrat occupies 
the White House.  
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The shortcomings of this work—to be improved upon in future research—are the 
lack of testable hypotheses.  It was not the intent of this work to present concrete operational 
definitions that lend themselves to testable hypotheses, but rather to simply propose a 
theoretical proposition.  Many anecdotal references were presented to augment the literature 
review and theoretical proposals, but it is understood that until theories are empirically 
verified, it is difficult to validate them.   
Future efforts to define monitoring and shirking behavior in a manner that is 
measureable and concrete might include the number of vacancies in top civilian posts in the 
Department of Defense, perceived foreign policy experience of presidents, prior to taking 
office—as measured by foreign policy experience on Senate or Congressional committees, 
positions held in defense establishment bureaucracies—i.e., Vice President Dick Cheney’s 
previous experience as Secretary of Defense—and the political party affiliation of 
presidents.  As an independent variable, the president’s party affiliation can be compared to 
a range of monitoring and shirking behaviors such as changes in military budgets, cuts or 
increases in military personnel, and actions that high level generals take—media statements, 
publication of memoirs, writing opposite the editorial page (op-ed) articles in major 
newspapers, among others—to try to influence military policies like “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” 
and missions imposed on the military (Feaver 1998).   
Patterns of civil-military relations have evolved and changed throughout American 
history, starting with George Washington’s submission to civilian authority after the 
American War for Independence.  Since then, the tradition of civilian control of the military 
has been upheld although at times tested.  Every time the tradition has been tested, the end 
result has been the validation of the tradition.  The Korean War, the Vietnam War, the First 
Gulf War, and the Second Gulf War all saw variations in patterns of civil-military relations 
and potential—as well as real—threats to the tradition of civilian control of the military.  
Principal-agent theory can be a fruitful lens from which to analyze and examine these 
patterns.  As the war on terror trudges on in its second decade, the principal-agent theory, 
more than a realist approach to studying civil-military relations in the United States, can 
show that that the United States military is amenable to analysis that purports to explain the 
dynamics of executive-bureaucratic relationships. 
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